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Abstract 
In 1999 the United States Congress passed the Y2K Act, a major—but temporary—
effort at reshaping American tort law. The Act strictly limited the scope and applicability 
of lawsuits related to liability for the Year 2000 Problem. This paper excavates the 
process that led to the Act, including its unlikely signature by President Clinton. The 
history presented here is based on a reconsideration of the Y2K crisis as a major episode 
in the history of computing. The Act, and the Y2K crisis more broadly, expose the 
complex interconnections of software, code, and law at the end of the 20th century, and, 
taken seriously, argue for the appreciation of the role of liability in the history of 
technology.  
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Introduction 
 
“It's almost a betrayal. After being told for years that technology is the path to a highly evolved future, 
it's come as something of a shock to discover that a computer system is not a shining city on a hill - 
perfect and ever new - but something more akin to an old farmhouse built bit by bit over decades by 
non-union carpenters.”1  
––  Ellen Ullman, “The Myth of Order” Wired, April 1999 
 
"It's the bug that finally gives lawyers the opportunity to rule the world," 2 
 
–– Evelyn Ashley, at a meeting of the American Bar Association, 1998 
 
 
The United States’ “Y2K Act” of 1999 took drastic steps to protect American 
companies from lawsuits related to the Year 2000 Problem (the “Y2K bug”).3 Among 
other changes, the Act gave all companies ninety days to solve any Y2K malfunctions, 
capped punitive damages, and stipulated that legal and financial responsibility would 
have to be distributed proportionately among any liable companies. These changes 
shielded larger and richer companies from lawsuits where their role was deemed 
marginal while simultaneously increasing the burden of proof on any potential 
claimants.  
The lead-up to the year 2000 was marked by urgent warnings about the potential 
damage of Y2K errors and the unpredictable harm and suffering resulting from the 
interweaving of computing technology with everyday life.4 As one response to these 
fears, the Y2K Act was meant to stave off a potential crisis in liability and insurance 
claims. Beyond this, the Act was a major policy feat and a significant gain for 
proponents of tort reform–i.e., limits on the scope and applicability of liability. From a 
historical perspective its passage provides useful insight into the role that legal liability, 
torts, and insurance play in the political management and mitigation of technological 
breakdown.  
This article approaches the history of computing through the largely forgotten 
process that brought the Y2K Act into law. Passage of the Act was opposed by 
entrenched political interests, including American trial attorneys, consumer advocates, 
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and many members and officials within the Democratic Party. The eventual success of 
the Act’s eventual passage involved unflinching support from the Republican Party and 
intense lobbying from their allies within American industry. Among the most 
vociferous in their support were the US Chamber of Commerce and a coalition of 
technology companies, who exercised their increased political clout. The episode also 
included a lengthy courtship, as both major American political parties sought to use 
Y2K as an opportunity to align themselves with a newly powerful tech industry. Despite 
vowing to veto the bill that became the Y2K Act, President Clinton’s signature marked 
what several commentators described as an unprecedented act of tort reform.  
From the vantage point of the present, the Y2K crisis is often dismissed as a false 
alarm and a product of hysteria and misinformation. Taken seriously, however, the crisis 
can better be understood as a major episode in the history of computing, the 
management of infrastructure, and the grassroots effort to educate diverse publics in 
the contingency of technology. As the controversy surrounding the passage of the Y2K 
Act shows, the crisis also exposed the complex interconnections of software, code, and 
law. This article approaches the Y2K Act as the convergence of two stories about Y2K 
and late-20th century American politics, capitalism, and the distribution of responsibility. 
The first story is one of technological malfunction and its repair, in which the 
unpredictable but potentially dire consequences of Y2K-related breakdown compelled 
a global effort at software and hardware remediation.5 The second story is a story of 
the normal functioning of American tort law and the ways that this functioning 
threatened the stability of an American industry.  
“Tort law” refers to the adjudication of civil suits where the law provides a 
framework for the remedy of a “wrong.” In practice, tort law exposes prevailing social 
norms about what constitutes an unacceptable wrong and what constitutes fair 
compensation for being wronged. As Lochlann Jain argues,  
Tort laws hold a peculiarly vital place in the United States, given–undoubtedly as 
a result of––the lack of universal health care coverage, the dearth of regulatory 
bodies… and the particular qualities of money, which can mutate in purpose from 
compensation to punishment.6 
Thus, plaintiffs “earn” compensation for being wronged and the state plays the pivotal 
role of defining certain wrongs and stipulating under which conditions compensation 
(punishment) might be limited. Lawrence Friedman argues that one of the grand 
changes in 20th century American society and, with it, American law, was the greater 
demand for legal justice seen in the law of torts: “a general expectation of justice, and a general 
expectation of recompense for injuries and loss.” 7 In the 19th century American law was far 
more favorable to businesses over individuals and workers. By contrast, 20th century 
torts generally embraced the principle that the liable had to accept responsibility, 
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coinciding with the higher level of labor and consumer organisation.8 In other words, 
in different eras liability law either acted as a safety net for corporations or for 
consumers and workers. The beneficiary in either case won protection through political 
clout. 
The law of torts can condition the ways technologies are developed, built, and 
used. Since uncertainty can stanch capital and limits on liability can accelerate how an 
industry invests capital, the legal coding of a market economy can determine which 
assets are “placed on steroids.”9 Against the backdrop of what Tom Streeter has called 
a “corporate liberal technology policy” liability for computing’s ills became a new 
political obstacle.10 The Y2K crisis presented a challenge to the social expectations 
surrounding both liability and the normal functioning of technology. By the mid-1990s, 
it had seemed that liability for computer-caused injury was a “non-starter” and claims 
of economic were similarly ineffective.11 The Year 2000 Problem tested these 
presumptions by recasting the categories of injury, negligence, and consumer in the 
context of the increasing everydayness of computerized infrastructure. The history of 
the Y2K Act provides a roadmap for writing the history of computing through the lens 
of legal responsibility and risk management.  
 
 
The Year 2000 Problem 
 
Leading up to the year 2000, news outlets, governments, and experts from across 
technical and financial industries warned that the world might experience widespread 
computer failures due to a common coding practice originating from the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. In programming languages from this period, including FORTRAN and 
COBOL, programmers could choose to represent dates in six digits instead of eight: 
DD-MM-YY, or, often: YY-MM-DD. The representation of the century as two digits 
created unknown but potentially catastrophic consequences if computers still running 
older software, or employing embedded chips, were forced to reckon with a century 
field containing only “00.”12   
 Writing in 1998 Paul Edwards used the occasion of the Year 2000 Problem to 
discuss the ways “computers have become, as it were, the infrastructure of our 
infrastructure.”13 Unlike other, traditional infrastructures, Edwards argued, computer 
infrastructures operated at a “meta-level” that pervaded social institutions through 
“internetworks.” While earlier glitches and breakdowns had exposed the 
internetworking of, say, financial industries or military systems, the Y2K crisis 
threatened chaos at a potentially global scale: 
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The results are unpredictable. Spectacular breakdowns in everything from military 
command-control systems to Internal Revenue Service tax computations are 
highly likely. Microprocessors embedded in everything from automobiles to 
elevators may fail. Rumor has it that some airlines are not accepting flight 
reservations for January 1, 2000, for fear of major confusion in the worldwide air 
traffic control system.14 
 
The structure of the Year 2000 problem was almost perfect for generating anxiety: it 
combined a definite date with indefinite dangers and the internetworking of computers 
made it virtually impossible to adequately model the fallout of cascading system failures. 
As Edwards indicates, the discomfiting nature of the crisis, for experts, was connected 
to the dread of its worst case scenarios, and, just as importantly, its profound 
uncertainty. Only the naïve and the cavalier pretended to know exactly what would 
happen. As Stephen Graham and Nigel Thrift argued, “during the Y2K crisis, even 
computer and software engineers often had little idea of the full archaeological 
sedimentation of decades worth of software within their computer networks.”15 
The uncertainty of Y2K errors was augmented by speculations about its root 
causes. Though blame is often singularly attributed to the six-digit format, the widely 
distributed antecedents to the Y2K crisis include economic imperatives, bureaucratic 
decisions, haphazard coding techniques, a lack of managerial oversight, and scant 
attention paid to software maintenance.16 All of these factors (among others, surely) 
contributed to the use of six digits as a de facto standard. For instance, six-digit dates 
were provided as the reference format within the data division of the revised COBOL 
specifications for 196117 and were enshrined as standard bureaucratic practice in 1968 
when the National Bureau of Standards published the Federal Information Processing 
Standards Publication 4.18 The twin uses of six-digit dates within coding manuals and 
government guidelines helped cement them as a norm but (mostly) went uncommented 
upon for decades to come.  
In the typical story about the Y2K crisis the choice to compress century dates is 
often attributed to the cost of computer memory in the 1960s. The choice to remove 
two additional digits is less controversial if we imagine the savings of eliminating those 
digits across thousands or millions of entries within a single government or business 
database—like those of the Social Security Administration, an insurer, or a bank. Others 
argue that the cost of memory in the 1960s was inflated by IBM through their practice 
of bundling cheaper CPUs with a small amount of memory, and charging more for 
additional memory, for which their profit margin was much higher.19 Regardless of the 
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target of blame there is no single cause of Y2K but rather a range of causes related to 
the representation of dates in digital systems and in formal standards.  
The first warnings about two-digit century dates came in the early 1970s. Bob 
Bemer, a computer programmer, member of CODASYL, and a longtime employee of 
IBM, Univac, General Electric, and Honeywell, claimed to be the first Cassandra of 
potential problems, writing in the Honeywell Computer Journal in 1971: 
The 4 digits of “year” may be reduced to 2 digits for “year of the century”, or to 
1 digit for “year of the decade”. It should be obvious, however, that extreme 
caution should be exercised in using these options for mechanical 
processing.20 
Bemer later repeated this warning in Interface Age in February 1979, with more 
specificity:  
don’t drop the first two digits for computer processing, unless you take extreme 
care, remembering that it’s only the “year of the century”. Otherwise the program 
may fail from ambiguity in the year 2000.21   
Beyond Bemer’s alerts, there were only scattered warnings about impending Year 2000 
Problems in the 1970s and 1980s. Though some rang alarm bells – Peter De Jager’s 
1993 article, “Doomsday 2000,” in Computerworld stands out –  it wasn’t until the mid-
1990s that Y2K started to receive widespread coverage.22 Bank of America offered a 
plaque to the first employee to find a Year 2000 problem in the 1980s, but did not start 
remediating their own code until 1996.23 By the late 1990s, however, a true “Y2K crisis” 
had taken hold, with the Gartner Group predicting as much as $600 billion in worldwide 
repair costs—though the actual total may have been much lower.24 In response to the 
threat of uncertainty, governments, corporations, community groups, and non-
governmental organizations launched massive repair programs, as well as educational 
campaigns meant to prepare populations for infrastructural malfunction. 
 Post-2000 analysis often treats the fear surrounding Y2K as hyped-up Fear, 
Uncertainty, and Doubt (FUD). But another view, that of the anti-FUD, treats the 
remediation effort as a period of worldwide software repair, hardware replacement, and 
public computer literacy campaigning meant to train individuals in understanding the 
nature of the crisis. Researching the crisis over recent years, I’ve been struck by buoyant 
postmortem memos and reports: celebrations of inter-departmental cooperation and 
the acceptance that the lack of largescale breakdown would mean that the preparatory 
efforts would never be fully appreciated. The Charles Babbage Institute holds the 
records of the Center for Y2K and Society –– a group of concerned citizens, convinced 
that the fallout of Y2K errors would be disastrous –– and the International Y2K 
Cooperation Center –– an organization funded by the World Bank and committed to 
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assuaging fear and uncertainty. Both organizations contain evidence of self-reflection 
from the post-2000 period. And although their predictions about January 1, 2000 
diverged, both groups claimed that the process of Y2K preparation was a unique 
experience of collective action.25 Some have also recently suggested that the organized 
response to the threat of Y2K is a potential model for organizing in response to climate 
change.26 
Y2K, then, is a fascinating historiographic challenge. Although we now know what 
didn’t happen—global infrastructural chaos—we can never be certain what may have 
happened. Though Y2K errors did not lead to infrastructural collapse, there were still 
consequences of broken code. In the United Kingdom, Y2K errors in the PathLAN 
system at Sheffield’s Northern General Hospital led to 154 expectant mothers receiving 
incorrect results for  prenatal tests. At least two terminations were carried out because 
of the dating error.27 Despite such incidents, Y2K is widely remembered as a punchline 
to the 1990s and an artifact of millenarian hysteria. Louis Menand recently referred to 
the crisis as a “nutty cocktail of digital overthink and Luddite millennialism.”28 This 
view is too simplistic. Not only does it ignore the effort to remediate potentially 
hazardous code, and the actual costs of computing errors, it misses the fact that Y2K 
was a significant moment of crisis planning and management. The crisis also served the 
invaluable purpose of exposing the perception of the “near immortality of computer 
software” and the intricate networks of technical and legal responsibility implicated by 
computer systems.29 The elusive nature of computing errors has been noted by 
historians of computing (Volmar & Dick 2018); however, we need to understand how 
this elusiveness plays out beyond patches and repair. In some cases malfunction seeps 
out into the legal sphere, where solutions take a different form. The political battles 
over Y2K liability, then, record the seepage of computing malfunction, and the 
desperate desire to control some –– any –– dimension of its aftermath. 
 
The lawsuit problem 
 
In July 1997 the Michigan-based supermarket Produce Palace filed a lawsuit 
against the manufacturer of its new cash register system, TEC America. At the core of 
the complaint was the claim that the TEC registers would crash and remain inoperable 
for as many as five hours after attempting to process credit cards with expiration dates 
after 1999.30 In other words, Produce Palace claimed that the register system was not 
Y2K compliant. Produce Palace v. TEC was memorialized as the first Y2K lawsuit.  
Produce Palace asserted claims against TEC for breach of warranty, violation of 
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, violation of the Michigan state consumer protection 
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act, breach of duty of good faith, negligence, misrepresentation, and breach of 
contract.31 TEC claimed that they had no contract and no warranty with Produce Palace. 
TEC promptly cross-claimed against All American Cash Register, the vendor who 
installed the system, and counter-sued Produce Palace, claiming the lawsuit was 
frivolous. Several months later, after a judge had dismissed several of Palace’s claims, 
the parties settled for $250 000, with TEC paying $240 000 and All American paying 
the remaining $10 000.  
Despite the settlement and the judge’s dismissals, Produce Palace v. TEC seemed to 
indicate two emerging realities: first, that potential year 2000 problems would be 
mundane and quotidian just as much as they might be catastrophic; second, that even a 
relatively small computer system (like one for processing payments in a grocery store) 
could expose a tangle of responsibility, as a range of intermediaries were involved in the 
manufacture, installation, and ongoing upkeep of both the hardware and software. This 
meant that pinpointing blame for a malfunctioning system could become both a 
technical challenge and a legal contest. And yet, despite this ambiguity, TEC found itself 
paying out a settlement for a system that it had not installed to a grocery store with 
which it did not have a contract.  
Perhaps most conspicuously, then, Produce Palace showed that within the complex 
arrangement of software companies, hardware manufacturers, vendors, and 
contractors, the costs of Y2K errors might inevitably redound upon companies that 
could most easily afford to pay settlements. This was borne out in the lawsuits that 
followed. By September 1998 at least sixteen lawsuits had been filed in connection with 
Y2K malfunctions: these included six claims against Intuit Inc. for older versions of 
Quicken, and claims against Symantec Corp. for its Norton AntiVirus software. There 
were also claims from stockholders made against companies that, the claimants argued, 
exaggerated their ability to generate Y2K-related business.32 There was growing 
evidence that demonstrated that any technical repair effort existed alongside a growing 
legal fight, which for technology companies and their insurers, represented  a massive 
hazard, and for trial attorneys, a lucrative opportunity.33  
It is in this context that liability became the focal point of debate. In addition to 
legal liability for malfunction and breakdown, there was fear of a “second order” liability 
fight between insurers and speculation that engineers could be held liable for any 
failures in equipment they had specified—even if they had no role in its installation or 
upkeep.34 As Y2K approached, insurers sought to limit their coverage for errors 
associated with Year 2000 Problems. In one policy carve-out proposed by the American 
Association of Insurance Services, it was suggested that the “insurer will not pay for 
property damage, personal injury, or advertising injury resulting from the failure of any 
electronic data processing equipment or computer program to correctly recognize “any 
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encoded, abbreviated, or encrypted date or time.” 35 This exclusion was so broad that it 
could be interpreted to include not only Y2K errors, but any fault related to the 
encoding and interpretation of stored dates and times.  
In the growing legal literature from the period, Palace and the subsequent lawsuits 
augured a “looming definitional battle” over the key liability categories of tangible 
property and physical injury, alongside knotty questions of causation.36 Writing in the 
Emory Law Journal Jeffrey Stempel argued that the determination of a physical injury 
threshold and the locus of causation would likely be most prominent:  
For example, in a case like Produce Palace, where Y2K problems caused the cash 
registers to freeze and become inoperative, was there "physical injury" to the cash 
registers and related supermarket equipment? Most courts would probably say yes. 
Even though the injury is not initially apparent to the eye, it is clear that the 
equipment is not working once the twenty-first century credit card is scanned into 
the system. The malfunction of the cash registers at that point is like a 
machine that stops working because of a broken rod inside. The owner 
cannot see it, but the machine clearly has something concretely broken.37 
This is a familiar gesture for historians of computing as the passage speaks directly to 
an attempt to emphasize and illustrate the materiality of computing through comparison 
to more obviously physical technologies (a register is like a machine, and an error is like 
a broken rod). This use of similes can render invisible and distributed processes as 
something legible and comprehensible. The concerns over injury and causation 
predated the Y2K Act but already highlighted what would soon become the central 
focus of the debate around the Act: namely, who determines causation for an error in 
a networked and interdependent computer system? How can we judge whether a 
physical injury is “palpable” and “detectable” when the breakdown of technology must 
be interpreted through phenomena like crashes and freezes? And how should 
responsibility (technical and monetary) be distributed among all of the stakeholders 
involved in such intricate systems?  
In addition to these sticky legal questions surrounding cause, injury, and evidence, 
perhaps the most important indication of the looming threat of Y2K lawsuits was their 
potential expense. The Gartner Group at one point predicted that punitive and 
compensatory damage claims could cost as much as $1 trillion, which eclipsed their 
estimate for the cost of technical repair. But in an early warning of the legal costs 
associated with Y2K, Gartner research director Lou Marcoccio said he had seen 
estimates as high as $3 trillion, while also stating simply that “Nobody really knows.” 
The unknown ceiling on litigation and damage payouts mirrored the history of Y2K 
bugs, from the indeterminacy of the crises’ origins and the uncertain threats to 
infrastructure and social order.  
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As the year 2000 approached, the news media coverage of Y2K problems started 
to merge the technological risks with the legal quagmire, with each being plagued by the 
difficulty of tracing causes in interdependent systems. As one commentator described 
the situation in 1998, the legal ramifications of computer failure came into focus as 
“lawyers [awakened] to the same sense of ubiquity, unpredictability and entanglement 
that engineers have long seen as the core of the Y2K problem.”38 Together with the 
ambiguity about how matters of causation and injury would be assessed, the unknown 
ceiling of potential litigation costs set the stage for the debate surrounding the Y2K Act.  
  
The Y2K Act  
 
While legal experts spent much of 1998 speculating about the fallout of Y2K-
related litigation, and Y2K lawsuits continued to be filed, Republican lawmakers and 
their allies were preparing legislation that would strictly delimit potential torts. In 
February of 1999 The Washington Post reported:  
Worried that the year 2000 computer problem will set off an avalanche of 
lawsuits, a powerful industry coalition yesterday drafted a legislative proposal 
aimed at limiting litigation and reducing liability damages in the event of business 
breakdowns.39  
That “powerful industry coalition” was led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and a 
group of roughly ninety industry representatives, including the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the National Federation of Independent Business, and the National 
Retail Federation.40 Together, the coalition had prepared a series of legislative demands 
during the early weeks of 1999—demands that would constitute the framework of the 
prospective Y2K Act over coming months. A spokesperson for the Chamber’s Institute 
for Legal Reform (a leading organization in the promotion of tort reform) claimed, 
“The idea is to take away the legal lottery and the encouragement for plaintiffs’ lawyers 
to turn this into a big windfall.”41 As Jake Tapper wrote at the time, “The [Chamber] 
has always wanted to legally limit the amount plaintiffs can be awarded, and it saw Y2K 
litigation reform as a first step toward fighting what Chamber president Thomas J. 
Donohue calls ‘avaricious trial attorneys.’”42  
The White House and Democrats in Congress opposed the legislation and were 
supported by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA), and by consumer 
advocates, who saw efforts at even temporary tort limitation as the thin edge of the 
wedge for a bigger reform project. They claimed that existing liability laws protected 
consumers and employees from hazards and negligence, and that the threat of lawsuits 
raised standards and encouraged vigilance. The president of the ATLA claimed that any 
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tort reform would act as a disincentive for actual Y2K repairs and claimed that the 
industry proposal would “take away the rights of the people they hurt to do anything 
about it.”43  
The Democrats were also supported by small-but-growing interest from 
members of the traditional and technology press. Early in the legislative process, 
editorials ran in local newspapers across the country, from the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 
“Let high-tech firms face Y2K problems,”44 The Tennessean, “Y2K bug begets bad 
bills,”45 to the Bangor Daily News, who decried the “grand gouge” that liability protection 
represented.46 Likewise in his column in the February 9 issue of Computerworld, the 
magazine’s editor-in-chief, Paul Gillin, argued, “Users should oppose [tort reform] 
efforts with all their power.”47 As for blame for Y2K, Gillin singled out “the vendors 
that capriciously ignored warnings from as long ago as the late ‘70s and that now are 
trying to buy a free pass from Congress.”48  
In 1998 trial attorneys saw the uncertain outcomes of Y2K rollover “as a business 
opportunity.”49 By 1999, though, the crisis had become the basis of a retaliation against 
trial attorneys and their clients, and the uncertainty of Y2K became a beachhead for 
larger tort reform aspirations. The hinge in both cases was the infrastructural 
entanglement of legacy code and embedded systems, and the challenge of defining 
blame and injury in interdependent systems. Both halves of this debate were 
opportunistic, treating the need to protect either consumers or businesses as a warrant 
for the redistribution of responsibility and liability.  
If this seemed like a fairly typical story of partisan Washington lobbying there 
was still one novel variable. The strengthening technology industry threatened to 
scramble existing allegiances. The industry’s immediate commercial interests fit with 
the plan to limit liability, and the Semiconductor Industry Association and the 
Information Technology Association of America had both joined in the Republican 
coalition’s legislative planning process. However, the presumptive nominee for the 
Democrats in the 2000 presidential election was Vice President Al Gore, whose early 
and instrumental support of the internet had positioned him as a booster of information 
technologies and a friend to Silicon Valley interests.50 Gore was the target of early and 
frequent lobbying efforts from the tech industry, including the venture capitalist John 
Doerr.51 Gore—and the White House—it seemed, would have to choose between a 
traditional ally in the ATLA and an emergent ally in the tech industry. As one 
commentator put it, “This is one of the few segments of the business community that 
hasn’t reflexively gone Republican… Now the Republicans have started to wake up and 
say, ‘We want the high-tech community to be ours.’”52 
To court the technology industry, the Republicans derided the ATLA by touting 
the economic success of the booming computer industry and by challenging Gore to 
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ignore their new political role. The Republican Chairman of the Congressional 
Campaign Committee stated plainly, with regards to the legislation: “Gore is scared to 
death… You have to choose between friends. . . . This one wedges them.”53 In response, 
one of Gore’s spokespeople agreed that the issue was a political instrument, and that 
the Republicans were “trying to create a wedge issue with the explicit desire to inflict . 
. . political damage on the vice president.”54 For historians of computing, the political 
manoeuvring of this debate are key. Not only was Y2K liability being leveraged to put 
Al Gore and the DNC in an awkward position, the perception was that the entire 
process was a courtship of the tech industry as a new and powerful ally.55 As reported 
in The Washington Post:  
 
“This is not just about Al Gore, it’s really about the future of the parties,” another 
Republican strategist said. “Right now, the political parties are out of date, 
aligned along issues and an approach to the economy that is 30 years old. Soon, 
the political alignment is going to be expressed in a division between old 
and new. This [high-tech] is a group that is up for grabs.”56 
 
The subsequent debate about the Y2K Act needs to be understood, then, as a complex 
knot of political, legal, and technological interests. Yes, this was a debate about Y2K 
preparations and an opportunistic attempt at tort reform. But it was also a contest to 
win the favor of the technology lobby—which meant the parties had to wager on the 
industry’s future economic and political clout. Liability, its applicability, and its 
distribution, became the territory for this contest to play out. 
 
Debate begins 
 
 The legislative battle began in earnest in March 1999, with the Senate moving to 
limit potential liability with bill S. 96. A subsequent bill in the House of Representatives, 
H.R. 775, went even further than the Senate bill in making changes to existing law.57 In 
testimony given to the House Judiciary Committee, the White House cautioned against 
taking major actions that “would increase public concern about our nation’s 
readiness.”58 In other words, observing a growing movement to limit the scope of 
liability, the Administration’s first gambit was to argue that potential legislation might 
give the impression that the country was unprepared for Y2K, which would run counter 
to their public position that the country was well on its way to Y2K compliance. 
Nonetheless, the Senate moved forward with S. 96, “The Y2K Act,” sponsored by 
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Republican Senators John McCain and Bill Frist, which included the legislative demands 
of the industry lobby.  
By April the White House’s congressional support had weakened, with Senator 
Ron Wyden stating he would support a compromise bill that amended S. 96—and 
various members of congress supporting alternative plans. The New Democratic 
Coalition was also seeking to align itself with Silicon Valley, with Rep. Calvin Dooley 
stating, “It’s important for Democrats to demonstrate to one of the most rapidly 
growing sectors of the economy that we understand the problems they are facing.”59 
With the administration adamant that they would veto the Senate or House bills, they 
offered their support for an amendment by Senators John Kerry and Charles Robb that 
would encourage all parties to seek negotiated settlements (a potential boon to trial 
attorneys).60 Kerry’s compromise was based a carve-out requested by the tech industry. 
The exception relied on the Year 2000 Readiness Disclosure Act, a separate piece of 
legislation that had passed in 1998 and was already viewed as a shield for many 
businesses. Kerry’s amendment to S. 96 would protect companies against some liability 
claims if it could be shown they had tried in good faith to fix all potential errors and to 
communicate known risks to their clients and customers.  
The conflict came to a head in June 1999, when McCain made some concessions 
and gained bipartisan support. But the Republican coalition had not clearly won over 
the public or its proxies in the media. In the first of two New York Times editorials about 
the debate the paper writes:  
 
Government can certainly help by providing loans, subsidies and expertise to 
computer users and, perhaps, by setting up special courts to adjudicate claims. 
Congress can also clarify the liability of companies once it becomes clear how 
widespread the problem really is. But before the new year, the Government 
should not use the millennium bug to overturn longstanding liability practices. A 
potential crisis is no time to abrogate legal rights.61 
 
Although the White House continued to promise a veto of the bill, their position 
became more difficult to maintain. What had begun as routine partisan jockeying and 
maneuvering now became a public debate about the role of computer technology in 
everyday life and the determination of responsibility should that technology fail.  
The push-back strategy was partially led from of the office of Vice President 
Gore’s Chief Domestic Policy Advisor, David Beier. On June 10, 1999 Beier and White 
House Chief of Staff John Podesta met with John Doerr and a group of “Silicon Valley 
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executives” to discuss liability reform.62 In the lead-up to the meeting, Beier laid out 
briefing material for Podesta:  
 
My guess is that what they are interested in is whether we are serious about 
vetoing the Senate bill. If we say we will, then that will be the story in the tech 
community and the press…. 
I assume there will be lot of whining and complaining about our position. I think 
we need to lean into a negotiate or we will do what we promised mode. [sic]63 
 
Simultaneously, Gore’s office was leading negotiations with the “Year 2000 Coalition” 
– the new title for the consortium of industry associations – and their Republican 
supporters in Congress. In the Vice President’s talking points, there is an attempt to 
reconcile his precarious position: 
 
We recognize that actual or potential Y2K failures may result in frivolous 
litigation. And we recognize that the high technology industry is most likely to 
be the target of frivolous litigation. . .  
But we also must be practical. We cannot let your goal be held hostage by those 
with a broader tort reform agenda.64 
 
The “your” of this statement is directed at Silicon Valley lobbyists, and Gore’s strategy 
was to portray Y2K tort limits as a Trojan Horse, at once an attempt to “create an issue 
with which to hurt the Vice President and the Democratic party” and an attempt to 
“create a precedent that would be impossible for us to avoid in future debates.”65 Of 
course, neither of these goals were a secret and had been expressed frequently by 
Republican lawmakers themselves. But this tactical analysis lacked the urgency of claims 
related to Y2K—either technical or financial—and did little to corroborate the 
brinksmanship of the President’s threatened veto.  
 While Gore’s office and the White House fought for the support of the tech 
industry and threatened a veto of the Senate bill, they were inundated with complaints 
from the legal lobby, citizens’ rights organizations, and much of the mainstream press. 
Beier’s records are full of supportive press clippings, recommendations from the 
American Bar Association, and pleas from Ralph Nader’s lobby group Public Citizen. 
But by the end of June, 1999 the legislative momentum was clearly behind the Y2K act, 
with only the President’s threatened veto holding it back. In conference negotiations, 
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the White House attempted to gain concessions regarding proportional liability and 
punitive caps. The administration’s talking points explicitly highlight negotiating 
principles that were a “HIGH TECH PRIORITY” (caps in original),66 though it is 
unclear if this notation was for the benefit of all the conferees or just the Democrats 
involved. In the end, however, they obtained only minor changes and the Senate passed 
an amended version of the House bill that incorporated S. 96, and sent it to President 
Clinton.  
 
Debate ends 
 
 On July 20, 1999 President Clinton reneged on his threat and signed the Y2K 
Act into law. The Y2K Act was a major feat of tort limitation—but temporary. In 
addition to a ninety-day grace period to fix any errors, the Y2K Act compelled most 
lawsuits to be heard in Federal Court, and capped punitive damages against small 
companies at three times the amount awarded for compensatory damages or $250 000 
(whichever was less).  
Perhaps most importantly for historians of computing seeking to understand 
legal and political encounters with computer infrastructure in the 1990s, the Act 
provided strict rules by which cause, responsibility, and proportional liability would be 
adjudicated. The Act suspended “joint and several liability,” which typically makes any 
defendant liable for the entire judgment when other defendants are unable to pay their 
share or cannot be sued. The Act also created a formula by which plaintiffs would have 
to demonstrate the share of each defendant’s responsibility for any Y2K breakdowns. 
Tort laws, as part of what Katharina Pistor calls, “the code of capital,” map and 
delineate responsibility; they also shape what, if any, form of justice is made available 
for wrongdoing. As the complexity and interdependence of computing became a 
pretext for rewriting tort law, the Y2K Act became an instrument for suspending the 
normal legal standard of responsibility. 
 The Act and its legislative process foreshadowed future debates about the state’s 
relationship in managing and mitigating harm from the entanglement of computing 
with everyday life. The Y2K crisis exposed the inseparability of computer infrastructure 
from the standard operating conditions of public order. For their part, proponents of 
the Y2K Act exploited the complexity of large computerized systems to redistribute 
responsibility for technical failure—a redistribution that would come to characterize the 
early 21st century’s interaction between business interests, new technologies, and 
consumer rights.  
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Conclusion 
 
The Y2K Act represents a peculiar moment in the history of computing. With 
hindsight, the passage of the Act appears to have signaled a confrontation with the 
distribution of responsibility for technological systems. The Act’s passage also makes it 
clear that the willingness to ascribe responsibility or blame for computing’s ills has 
always been limited—and specifically limited by state interventions in the normal 
business of corporate enterprise. Both the front- and backstage negotiations over the 
Y2K Act foreshadowed the mounting importance of the tech lobby within American 
policy-making processes.  
Liability presents a potentially rich avenue of research for those interested in the 
history of technology and political negotiations over responsibility.  Some have argued 
that the legalization and formation of limited liability corporations was a crucial 
development in modern capitalism.67 Likewise, recent debates about tech company 
responsibility, the governance of the web, and the management of online content have 
frequently turned to the limits on liability and responsibility stipulated in Section 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act.68 We might question, then, how our histories of 
computing might be re-inflected through histories of liability and its limitations. 
For those now reckoning with the history of computing in the 1990s (especially in 
the global north) the decade can be seen as a hinge that connects the relatively open 
architecture of the internet with the commercial interests of those hosting content—
and the conflict of these two models for a networked society. The story of the Y2K Act 
exposes a different aspect of this history. It centers the emerging importance of Silicon 
Valley as a coherent bloc of political actors and the many ways that state, corporate, 
and civil society institutions thought about and mitigated their reliance on legacy code.  
The episode helps clarify how moments of legal and technological reorganization are 
negotiated through liability; it is also a reminder that as we face renewed calls for 
technology firms to take responsibility for social ills, that we’ve been down this road 
before, and that the ways we distribute responsibility will have far-reaching 
consequences.  
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